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A HEALTHY STATE OF MIND:
THE ROLE OF INTENT IN HEALTH CARE
SERVICE PLAN RESCISSIONS
Gerald S. Flanagan *
Under California law, a health care service plan ("health plan ') may
use an individual applicant's health condition as a consideration when
determining whether to sell the applicant a coverage policy. A health
plan can refuse to provide coverage even if an applicant has only minor
health problems. Previously, the California Department of Managed
Health Care (DMHC) prohibited a health plan from rescinding a
coverage policy unless a patient had willfully misrepresented her health
information during the application process. However, following dicta in
a recent California Court of Appeal decision, the DMHC now
apparently affirms rescissions that are based on patients' failure to
disclose health information regardless of whether the alleged omissions
or misrepresentations were intentional, willful, or knowing. In Hailey v.
California Physicians' Service, the court noted that a health plan may
rescind coverage based on an inadvertent omission or
misrepresentation, including health conditions that a patient did not
know about or did not understand, as long as the court finds that the
health plan made a "reasonable effort" to determine whether the
application was complete at the time it was submitted. The DMHC's
overly broad interpretation of Hailey conflicts with California Supreme
Court precedent that protects innocent patients from rescission who
have coverage provided by health insurance companies, which are
governed by a legislative and regulatory regime that is distinct from
that of health plans. The DMHC's tacit approval of this practice by
health plans places innocent patients at risk of losing coverage when
they get sick and need it the most.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., University of
California, Berkeley. I would like to thank the editors and the staff of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their hard work and contribution to this Note. A very special thanks to
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importantly, I would like to thank Maile and Miles, whose love and support make everything
possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are diagnosed with a serious illness. Luckily, you
have health care coverage. Or do you? You may not, according to
California regulators, if you unintentionally omitted a medical detail
when you applied for coverage. In a dramatic reversal of policy,
regulators at the California Department of Managed Health Care
(DMHC)' have apparently affirmed the health care service plan
("health plan") practice of rescinding individual health coverage
contracts on the basis of inadvertent omissions by applicants in their
applications for coverage.2 Previously, the DMHC's policies and
official statements acknowledged that rescission must be limited to
cases of willful misrepresentation by the applicant.3 The DMHC
regulators' new view of the law of health coverage rescission relies
1. The DMHC is responsible for regulating health care service plans, including health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and some preferred provider organizations (PPOs), under
California Health and Safety Code sections 1340-1399.970 ("Knox-Keene Health Care Service
Plan Act of 1975"). The Department of Insurance regulates health insurers. J. CLARK KELSO,
CAPITAL CTR. FOR GOV'T LAW & POLICY AT UNIV. OF THE PAC. McGEORGE SCH. OF LAW,
REGULATORY JURISDICTION OVER HEALTH INSURANCE PRODUCTS: THE DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGED HEALTH CARE & THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE 5-15 (2001). Approximately 22
million Californians receive health coverage from companies regulated by the DMHC. Id. The
director of the DMHC is appointed by the governor of California. Id. The DMHC is a
subdepartment of the State of California Business, Transportation and Housing Agency. Id.
2. Business Practices in the Individual Health Insurance Market: Hearing Before the H
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (prepared statement of Dale
Bonner, Sec'y Cal. Bus., Transp. and Hous. Agency) [hereinafter Hearing] ("Current law states
that the 'insurer must either complete medical underwriting up front or show that the enrollee
willfully omitted or misrepresented information on the application."').
3. Amicus Curiae Brief by the California Dep't of Managed Health Care in Support of
Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants, and Appellants at 4, Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr.
3d 789 (Ct. App. 2007) (No. G035579) [hereinafter DMHC Amicus] ("Because of the
catastrophic consequences of losing health care coverage, and in furtherance of the consumer
protection purpose of the Knox-Keene Act, the Legislature enacted section 1389.3 . . . [which]
allows a health plan to rescind coverage only in cases where it has met its burden of
demonstrating that the consumer willfully misrepresented his or her health history." (emphasis
added)); id. at 14 ("[S]ection 1389.3 ... requires health plans to demonstrate that an applicant
willfully misrepresented his or her health history before invoking other remedies such as
rescission. That requirement exists in all cases, not just those where the plan failed to resolve all
reasonable questions arising from the information submitted on or with the application."
(emphasis added)); see also DIV. OF PLAN SURVEYS, DEP'T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, NON-
ROUTINE MEDICAL SURVEY OF BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA 3 (2007) [hereinafter DMHC
AUDIT] (finding that Blue Cross of California routinely rescinded health policies in violation of
state law by failing to establish that an enrollee willfully misrepresented a health condition); Lisa
Girion, Health Plan Review May Be Intensified, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at DI (paraphrasing
DMHC director Cindy Ehnes's statement that the "law banned retroactive rescissions unless a
health plan could show that a policyholder intentionally lied about his health history on his
application for coverage").
A HEALTHY STATE OF MIND
on dicta in a recent California Court of Appeal decision, Hailey v.
California Physicians' Service.4 The regulators' overbroad reading
of Hailey puts an innocent patient at risk of losing coverage when she
gets sick and needs it the most if she failed to report medical
information that she was not even aware of or did not understand
when she applied for coverage.
State, national, and international news reports5 tell the stories of
some of the thousands of Californians and their families who have
faced health coverage rescissions since 2004.6 A patient whose
health coverage is rescinded ("rescinded patient") is left uninsured,
likely uninsurable,7 and often deep in medical debt while facing
ongoing health care needs.8 In a typical example,9 after a patient files
a major claim for health coverage, such as cancer treatment, '0 the
health plan scrutinizes the patient's medical record and compares it
to the information the patient provided in her application for
coverage, looking for any "omitted" or "misrepresented"
information. " If the health plan finds any information that it deems
"omitted" or "misrepresented," the health plan then rescinds
coverage even if the patient innocently failed to disclose minor
health information on the application. For example, a health plan
rescinded a patient's policy for the patient's failure to disclose a
single back spasm that the patient experienced years before
4. 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2007).
5. Consumer Watchdog, Archive of News Coverage, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org
(search for "rescission") (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
6. Lisa Girion, Anthem Blue Cross Sued Over Rescissions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at
Cl.
7. See discussion infra Part III.C.
8. David U. Himmelstein et. al., Marketwatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Feb. 2, 2005, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/
hlthaff.w5.63/DC1 (finding that nearly half of all Americans who file for bankruptcy do so
because of medical expenses).
9. The example is based on hundreds of complaints reviewed by the author.
10. Lisa Girion, Sick but Insured? Think Again, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at AI (reporting
that Blue Cross designated an entire department inside the company that, upon receiving patients'
high-dollar-value insurance claims, reviews medical records and investigates a patient's insurance
risk).
11. Refiled Motion for Judicial Notice of Shernoff, Bidart & Darras, LLP, at Exhibit A, B &
C, Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2007) (No. G035579)
[hereinafter Shemoff Motion] (relating testimony from Blue Shield employees stating that prior
to rescinding a policy the company did not attempt to determine whether omissions on
applications constituted a "willful misrepresentation").
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completing the application. 12 Health plans are known to take such
action regardless of whether the patient knew of the information the
health plan alleges was omitted. "3
DMHC regulators interpret the Hailey"4 decision as allowing
health plans to rescind a patient's coverage for failing to disclose
health information regardless of the patient's state of mind when she
applied for coverage-regardless of whether the alleged omission or
misrepresentation was intentional, willful, or knowing. 1 The
regulators' interpretation conflicts with California Supreme Court
precedent that protects innocent patients from rescission who have
coverage provided by health insurance companies-which are
governed by a legislative and regulatory regime that is distinct from
that of health plans. 16 Because of heavy lobbying by health plans, 7
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed bipartisan
legislation designed to remedy this apparent conflict in the law of
rescission governing health plans and health insurers. "
California consumers face a confusing alphabet soup of health
coverage options to choose from: HMO, PPO, EPO, and POS to
name a few. "9 There is often little apparent difference to consumers
and courts between two broad groupings of coverage, which are
largely distinguished by the type of company that sells it-health
plans and health insurance companies. 20 However, the two groups
are regulated by distinct regulatory agencies and separate legal
12. See Complaint at 4, Knee v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. BC389440 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2008).
13. Shernoff Motion, supra note 11, at Exhibit A, B & C.
14. 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2007).
15. Id.
16. See Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973); Runyan v.
Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970).
17. On numerous occasions prior to vetoing the legislation, including in his 2008 State of the
State address, Governor Schwarzenegger pledged to protect innocent patients from rescission.
E.g., Lisa Girion, Bonuses for Cutting Coverage is Banned, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at C3
("Until we achieve comprehensive healthcare reform, stopping unfair healthcare rescissions is an
urgently needed consumer protection .... "); Lisa Girion, State Fines 2 Health Plans Over
Canceled Coverage, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2008, at AI; Dorsey Griffith, Patients Get a Victory as
State Restores Insurance for Some, Orders Reviews for Thousands, SACRAMENTO BEE, April 18,
2008, at At ("lit is] outrageous that innocent patients have to live in fear of losing their health
care coverage. I look forward to working with my partners in the Legislature to ensure this
egregious practice is stopped.").
18. Editorial, Schwarzenegger Abandons the Sick, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A20.
19. See KELSO, supra note 1, at 1-2.
20. Id. at 7.
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codes: the Department of Insurance and the Insurance Code govern
health insurers, whereas the Department of Managed Health Care
and the Health and Safety Code govern health plans. 21 Additionally,
some companies have subsidiaries licensed by both departments,
which adds to the complexity that confronts consumers. 
2
California's bifurcated regulatory approach adds up to an unfortunate
truth for consumers: what you do not know can hurt you.
This Note argues that either proposed but currently shelved
regulations clarifying the legal standard for health plan rescissions
should be implemented,23 or new legislation or court action should
be implemented to bring health plan rescissions in line with the
California Supreme Court fairness doctrine that applies to health
insurance companies. Without at least one of these changes,
Californians will continue to face a form of "health care apartheid."
Innocent patients enrolled in health plan coverage will continue to be
at risk of having their coverage rescinded when they get sick and
need health care the most, while those enrolled in health insurance
coverage will enjoy a higher level of protection. 24 Part II of this Note
discusses California law applying to health plan coverage
rescissions. Part III explores the threats facing innocent health plan
patients under the DMHC regulators' overbroad reading of Hailey,
and the divergent Supreme Court precedent that applies to health
insurance companies. Finally, Part IV proposes solutions to close the
apparent conflict by protecting all innocent patients from coverage
rescissions, regardless of whether they have health plan or health
insurance coverage.
II. STATE OF EXISTING LAW
The Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 ("Knox-
Keene Act"), which governs health plans, seeks to balance the
21. Id. at 1-2.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Draft Postclaims Underwriting Regulations, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28 §§ 1300.89.1,
1300.89.3 (2006), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/
DraftPCUWRegs.pdf ("No subscriber contract shall be cancelled or rescinded because of a
misstatement or omission in the coverage contract, unless the misstatement or omission is a result
of the applicant's willful misrepresentation and the omitted information would have been a basis
for denial of coverage pursuant to the plan's underwriting criteria, guidelines, policies, and
procedures.").
24. See KELSO, supra note 1.
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competing interests of health plans and the people they insure, which
by their nature are adverse. 25 On average, families spend $13,375 26 a
year on health coverage policies to ensure that they will have access
to health care when it is necessary. 27 Health plans seek to limit their
exposure to large medical claims by refusing to sell policies to
applicants with preexisting health problems or limiting payouts once
a policy has been sold.28 In striking a balance between the two sides'
competing interests, the California Supreme Court has established
that once an insurance company grants a policy for coverage, it must
give at least as much consideration to the insured's interests in
accessing health care as it does to its own interest in maximizing
financial gain. 29 This balancing should work to constrain a company
from profiting by wrongfully rescinding health coverage.
Unlike the twelve states that bar health plans from refusing to
sell health coverage based on an applicant's health history,3"
California law allows health plans to refuse to sell a coverage policy
to an applicant with even minor health problems. 31 Thus, health plans
25. See WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET. AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 1.02 (Lexis
Nexis 2004) ("The tort of bad faith has grown out of an appreciation of the fact that an insurance
contract is . . . totally inadequate in protecting the consumer from the wrongful denial of
insurance claims."); see also DMHC Amicus, supra note 3, at 20 ( "[T]he final version of section
1389.3 balanced the competing concerns of protecting California consumers from discriminatory
practices by health insurance companies and of allowing health plans to protect against fraud.").
26. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. AND HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS SURVEY, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2009), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/
pdf/2009/7936.pdf.
27. This Note focuses on the California individual health insurance market. Individual
policies for individual or family coverage are purchased directly by the consumer, sometimes
with the assistance of an insurance broker. The recent policy rescissions in California have
occurred among individually purchased policies rather than group policies provided by
employers. Under California law, health plans may medically underwrite individuals and their
families in the individual market and refuse to sell coverage based on an applicant's condition,
but they may not do so in the group market. Such rescissions based on an allegation that the
patient misrepresented a health condition when applying for coverage do not exist in twelve states
that bar insurers from using health histories as a basis for determining eligibility for individual
health insurance. See NCSL HEALTH PROGRAM, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE SMALL GROUP HEALTH REFORM-A BRIEF HISTORY 2-3 (2006) [hereinafter NCSL
REPORT]; see also discussion infra Part III.C (discussing in greater detail the use of rescission as
a remedy).
28. See SHERNOFF, supra note 25, at § 1.01.
29. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141,145 (Cal. 1979).
30. NCSL REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-3.
31. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.1 (West 2007); see also Press Release, Consumer
Watchdog, Internal Documents Show Insurers Won't Sell Health Policies to Cops, Firefighters,
Expectant Dads, Allergy & Acne Sufferers, etc., (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.consumer
watchdog.org/patients/articles/?storyld=15166 (stating that underwriting guidelines allow
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commonly require applicants to detail their medical histories on
enrollment applications and to provide access to medical records
before a policy is issued. 32 Electronic databases make accessing an
applicant's medical files by health plans cost-effective and
efficient. "
Once information is collected, the health plan begins the process
known as "underwriting" during which the applicant's health history
is compared to preestablished guidelines. These underwriting
guidelines, developed and controlled by health plans,34 determine
whether an applicant who currently has or has had health problems
will be sold a policy for coverage. " So-called preexisting health
conditions disclosed on applications commonly lead health plans to
refuse to sell policies. 36
Congruously, Health and Safety Code section 1389.3 requires
health plans to decide whether to provide coverage to a patient by
completing the underwriting process before the policy is sold. " This
seemingly obvious requirement is a linchpin in balancing the
interests of the health plan and the interests of the patient. The health
plan retains the ability to limit risk exposure prior to issuing a
coverage policy. Meanwhile, if denied a policy up front, the
consumer may shop around for coverage elsewhere.
However, once a health plan issues a coverage contract, that
contract is a promise that the health plan will protect enrollees
against future financial losses resulting from illness and injury in
exchange for timely payments of premiums.38 But, health plans
routinely violate the underwriting requirements of section 1389.3 by
insurers to deny coverage to patients with minor health conditions, such as asthma, acne,
allergies, and toenail fungus).
32. California Dep't of Insurance, Consumers: Individual Health Insurance Underwriting,
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01 00-consumers/0070-health-issues/ind-health-insur
ance-underwriting-ab-356.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
33. See Brief of United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6-9,
Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2007) (No. G035579) (pointing
out that medical records may be accessed for $2.42 per patient); JON SHREVE, MILLMAN INC.,
THE IMPACT OF THE M1B CHECKING SERVICE ON HEALTH INSURANCE UNDERWRITING 1 (2007)
(stating that the use of medical record databases saves health insurers an average of $46 for every
$1 spent).
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.4.
35. California Dep't of Insurance, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3.
38. SHERNOFF, supra note 25, at § 1.02.
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waiting to investigate a patient's insurance risk until after receiving
high-dollar-value claims--a procedure known as "postclaims
underwriting" 4  -even though this practice is illegal under California
law and invalidates any rescission resulting from such a review. 41
The key distinction, of course, between illegal postclaims
underwriting and the allowed precontract investigation into an
applicant's insurability is timing. Health plans engaging in
postclaims underwriting issue coverage with little or no investigation
into an applicant's insurability. 42 Then, once a high-dollar-value
claim is filed, the health plan seeks to avoid contract liability by
aggressively investigating a patient's medical records and
application, looking for any "minutiae in the insured's medical
history to avoid payment on the claim and to justify rescission of the
contract."
43
When it comes to health coverage rescissions, hindsight is
20/20. According to health plans, because any omission or
misrepresentation on an application provides the basis for rescission,
a health plan seeking to rescind the coverage of an ill patient will
almost certainly find a reason to do SO. 4 4  Thus, postclaims
underwriting has been called "an underwriting abomination ... an
artificial vehicle for contract avoidance . . . quintessentially
opportunistic."45  Further, plaintiffs' attorneys allege that
intentionally vague questions on enrollment applications are
39. Girion, supra note 10, at AL.
40. Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 102 W. VA. L. REv.
809, 810 (2000).
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3.
42. Cady & Gates, supra note 40, at 823-24.
43. DMHC Amicus,supra note 3, at 10-11.
44. Ticconi v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888, 893 (Ct.
App. 2008) ("Blue Shield Life explained that short-term policies are wholly underwritten through
the questions on the application.").
45. Cady & Gates, supra note 40, at 810; see also Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 789, 805-06 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Blue Shield's underwriting investigator testified the
company referred approximately 1,000 claims a year to her for investigation of possible
misrepresentations or omissions in the subscribers' applications. Yet, she testified she decides to
rescind in less than one percent of the cases she investigates. These facts raise the specter that
Blue Shield does not immediately rescind health care contracts upon learning of potential grounds
for rescission, but waits until the claims submitted under that contract exceed the monthly
premiums being collected. In other words, a health care services plan may not adopt a 'wait and
see' attitude after learning of facts justifying rescission by continuing to collect premiums while
keeping open its rescission option if the subscriber later experiences a serious accident or illness
that generates large medical expenses.").
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designed to induce applicants to omit or misrepresent their health
histories, thereby providing the basis for policy rescissions when
patients file claims for an expensive treatment.46
Rescission of health coverage following an illness and claims
for treatment has a particularly harsh impact on the patient.
Rescinded coverage is cancelled as of the day of issuance, leaving
patients to pay unpaid medical bills, and possibly even to reimburse
health plans for medical bills that health plans have already paid. 4
Patients left without health coverage may suffer great personal
hardship or bankruptcy and must often rely on overstretched public
health programs for ongoing medical treatment. 48 To protect the
interests of society, patients and health plans, Health and Safety
Code section 1389.3 41 was intended to prohibit a health plan from
rescinding coverage once a contract has been approved and issued,
except in instances where a patient is shown to have "willfully
misrepresented" health conditions on her application for coverage. "
This standard limits the rescission remedy to instances where an
applicant committed fraud during the application process by
concealing a known health condition. 51 If the patient is innocent of
such concealment, the health plan bears the risk of having to provide
health coverage in accordance with the coverage contract. 5 But,
health plans routinely violate this requirement by rescinding policies
46. Complaint, supra note 12, at 2.
47. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 799.
48. Himmelstein, supra note 8.
49. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3 (West 2007).
50. See Letter from Art Torres, Chair, Senate Comm. on Ins., Claims and Corps., to
Governor Peter Wilson (Sept. 24, 1993) (on file with author). In enacting AB 1100, the legislative
vehicle for Health and Safety Code section 1389.3, the legislature barred postclaims underwriting,
defined as "[t]he practice by an insurer, following a claim by an insured, of unilaterally rescinding
a contract based on alleged-often minor-misrepresentations on the application or enrollment
form. This bill would prohibit insurers from going back and canceling coverage.... Fraud is not
protected! Nothing in this bill limits the ability of an insurance company to deny benefits when
the applicant has made fraudulent statements in their application." Id.; accord DMHC Amicus,
supra note 3, at 17 ("In enacting section 1389.3, the Legislature sought to prevent the grievous
harm caused by the pernicious practice of post-claims underwriting to AIDS victims and those
with other chronic illnesses .... [To accomplish these goals,) the Legislature expressly prohibited
postclaims underwriting and required health plans to meet the burden of demonstrating that an
enrollee willfully misrepresented his or her health history before taking the harsh remedy of
rescission, as evidenced by the chosen language." (emphasis added)).
51. DMHC Amicus, supra note 3, at 17.
52. See id.
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because of omissions on enrollment applications regardless of
whether those omissions were "willful."53
Health and Safety Code section 1389.3's requirement for a
showing of willful misrepresentation before health coverage may be
rescinded is consistent with the fairness doctrine applicable to health
insurers established by the California Supreme Court.54 Those
principles, as well as the legislative intent of section 1389.3, are at
odds with the DMHC regulators' view that a patient's state of mind
at the time she completed her application for coverage is not an
essential factor in determining whether a rescission is rightful. " In
Thompson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co.,56 the California
Supreme Court found that a failure to disclose medical information
could not provide the basis for voiding coverage if the applicant "had
no present knowledge of the facts sought, or failed to appreciate the
significance of information related to him."57 Furthermore, in
Runyan v. Pacifica Air Industries, Inc."g the supreme court
announced that a rescinded party innocent of fraud must be returned
to the status quo ante. " However, in the health plan context, it may
not be possible to return a patient to the status quo ante, thus
rescission may not be a valid remedy for a health plan if the patient is
found to be innocent of fraud. 60
A. Health and Safety Code Section 1389.3
Health and Safety Code section 1389.3 bars "postclaims
underwriting,"61 defined as the rescinding of a policy due to a
company's failure to complete medical underwriting prior to granting
coverage.
No health care service plan shall engage in the practice of
postclaims underwriting. For purposes of this section,
"postclaims underwriting" means the rescinding, canceling,
53. Shernoff Motion, supra note 11, at Exhibit A, B & C; DMHC AUDIT, supra note 3, at 2.
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3.
55. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
56. 513 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1973).
57. Id: at 360.
58. 466 P.2d 682 (Cal. 1970).
59. Id. at 691; see also discussion infra Part 1II.C (detailing limitations to the rescission
remedy in the health plan context).
60. Runyan, 466 P.2d at 681.
61. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3 (West 2007).
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or limiting of a plan contract due to the plan's failure to
complete medical underwriting and resolve all reasonable
questions arising from the written information submitted on
or with an application before issuing the plan contract. This
section shall not limit a plan's remedies upon a showing of
willful misrepresentation. 62
The limited right to rescind provided in section 1389.3 63 upon a
showing of "willful misrepresentation" follows the narrow
provisions for canceling or not renewing a health coverage contract,
which requires a demonstration of the enrollee's intentional bad
faith.' Specifically, Health and Safety Code section 1365 allows
health plans to cancel coverage due to an enrollee's "failure to pay"
or "fraud or deception."65 Under section 1357.54, a health plan may
only refuse to renew coverage under an equally narrow set of
circumstances, including when an enrollee commits fraud or is found
to have made an "intentional misrepresentation of material fact." 
66
In response to widespread reports of policy rescissions,6 7 the
DMHC issued draft regulations in October 2007 intended to clarify
the requirements of rescission as it relates to health plans. 68 The
regulations interpreted Health and Safety Code section 1389.3 as
barring any health plan rescission unless a patient "willfully
misrepresented" a material health condition.69 Thus, the draft
regulations are consistent with the legislative intent of section 1389.3
which bars rescission except in limited instances where a patient is
shown to have willfully misrepresented a health condition when
applying for coverage.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. See id. § 1365.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 1357.54.
67. Girion, supra note 3, at Cl.
68. Lisa Girion, Regulators Aim to Curb Healthcare Rescissions, L.A. TItMES, Oct. 24, 2007,
at Cl.
69. Draft Postclaims Underwriting Regulations, 28 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28 §§ 1300.89.1,
1300.89.3 (2006), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/
DraftPCUWRegs.pdf ("No subscriber contract shall be cancelled or rescinded because of a
misstatement or omission in the coverage contract, unless the misstatement or omission is a result
of the applicant's willful misrepresentation and the omitted information would have been a basis
for denial of coverage pursuant to the plan's underwriting criteria, guidelines, policies, and
procedures.").
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B. Hailey v. California Physicians' Service
In December 2007, the California Court of Appeal announced its
decision in Hailey v. California Physicians' Service,7 ° the only
published decision directly interpreting Health and Safety Code
section 1389.3.71
When Cindy Hailey started a new job in late 2000, she opted for
an individual policy for her family offered by Blue Shield of
California" instead of coverage offered by her employer. " Cindy
claimed that when filling out the application for coverage, she
mistakenly believed the application only sought information relating
to her health and not that of her husband, Steve. Though Cindy
provided information about her own health, she omitted Steve's
information.74 Based solely on the information provided in the
application, Blue Shield granted coverage to the Haileys. "
When Steve was admitted to the hospital for stomach problems
shortly after coverage was granted, Blue Shield began to investigate
the Haileys for possible fraud during the application process.76 In the
course of the probe, Blue Shield obtained Steve's medical records for
the first time,77 and based solely on those records, determined that
the Haileys had intentionally misrepresented7 information about
Steve's weight and past medical problems. "
Following a car accident that permanently disabled Steve several
months later, Blue Shield rescinded the Haileys' health coverage
contract. "0 In addition to refusing to pay $457,000 in medical bills
related to Steve's car accident, Blue Shield demanded that the
Haileys pay $60,777.10-the difference between the amount Blue
70. 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2007).
71. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 1389.3.
72. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795-96.
73. Id.




78. "Intentional misrepresentation" is the rescission standard referenced in the Blue Cross
coverage policies. Blue Cross of California Application (on file with author).
79. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 796.
80. Id.
A HEALTHY STATE OF MIND
Shield had paid for Steve's care and the total amount in premiums
the Haileys had paid for their health coverage. "I
The Court of Appeal found that Cindy's explanation of her
omission of Steve's medical information was supported by the
misleading nature of the questions in the application. 8 2 The court
explained that Cindy's belief that the application was requesting only
her information "negates an inference that [Cindy's] understatement
of Steve's weight on the application was willful."83 Steve's reliance
on Cindy to accurately complete the application "also negates an
inference of willfulness."84
In its opinion, the Hailey court focused on Blue Shield's
decision to issue coverage solely on the basis of the information
provided in the Haileys' application for coverage.85 The court
concluded that under Health and Safety Code section 1389.3,86 prior
to issuing a policy, health plans must complete medical underwriting
which requires "a [health] plan to make reasonable efforts to ensure a
potential subscriber's application is accurate and complete." 87
In other words, basing a decision to issue health coverage solely
on the information provided on the application, as Blue Shield did in
Hailey, 8 does not constitute medical underwriting.89 Hailey held that
where a health plan fails to complete any underwriting because it
only reviewed the application for coverage, the health plan must
show the applicant "willfully misrepresented" the health information
in question before rescinding the coverage. 90
81. Id.
82. Id. at 798-99.
83. Id. at 799. At trial, following remand, the judge issued a directed verdict in which the
Haileys stipulated to misrepresenting information on their application for coverage apparently in
exchange for Blue Shield dropping a countersuit against them and waiving all court costs and
fees. Evan George, Health Care Ruling Raises Questions for Other Cases, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL,
June 3, 2009, available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/patients/articles/?storyId=27737.
84. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 799.
85. Id. at 799-800.
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3 (West 2007).
87. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 800.
88. Id. at 796; see also Ticconi v. Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., 72 Cal. Rptr.
3d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Blue Shield Life explained that short-term policies are wholly
underwritten through the questions on the application.").
89. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 796.
90. Id. at 804. ("Because Blue Shield failed to demonstrate it made reasonable efforts to
ensure the Haileys' application was accurate and complete as part of its precontract underwriting
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Regulators have taken an astoundingly broad view of Hailey.
Regulators at the DMHC often cite9 a broad statement by the Hailey
court that
section 1389.3 precludes a health services plan from
rescinding a contract for a material misrepresentation or
omission unless the plan can demonstrate (1) the
misrepresentation or omission was willful, or (2) it had
made reasonable efforts to ensure the subscriber's
application was accurate and complete as part of the
precontract underwriting process. 92
Under the DMHC regulators' reading of Hailey, the health plan
may rescind as long as the health plan's precontract medical
underwriting is deemed to have been a "reasonable effort" to
determine whether the application was complete, regardless of
whether the omission or misrepresentation was the product of a
willful act. 9' Hailey does not define what constitutes a "reasonable
effort" but only provides that relying on the application alone does
not constitute medical underwriting. 94
C. Assembly Bill 1945
Shortly following the ruling in Hailey, the California Legislature
passed Assembly Bill 1945 ("AB 1945"), 9' to bring the DMHC
regulators' reading of Hailey96 in line with the legal requirements for
rescission by health insurers under California Supreme Court
precedent. 97 The bill stated that a health plan must, prior to
rescinding a coverage contract, "demonstrate[] that the applicant
intentionally misrepresented or intentionally omitted material
information on the application . . . with the purpose of
process, and the Haileys raised a triable issue of fact whether they willfully misrepresented
Steve's physical condition when they applied for coverage, we reverse the judgment.").
91. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
92. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795 (emphasis added).
93. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
94. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 800.
95. Assemb. B. 1945, 2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008).
96. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
97. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973); Runyan v.
Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970).
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misrepresenting his or her health history in order to obtain health
care coverage."98
The need for such legislative clarification is palpable. Industry
representatives would gladly ignore the patient-friendly fairness
doctrine of Thompson and Runyan. For instance, when Governor
Schwarzenegger vetoed AB 1945, Christopher Ohman-president of
the California Association of Health Plans, a lobbying association
representing health plans 99 -remarked, "This bill would have
undermined 100 years of contract law that allows contracts to be
rescinded for failure to disclose a material fact regardless of
intent." '00
III. CRITIQUE
The DMHC regulators' reading of Hailey1 ' contradicts existing
law and doctrine in several ways. First, the regulators' reading of
Hailey"12 contravenes public policy articulated by the regulators
themselves 03 as well as the legislative intent of the Health and
Safety Code. Second, it violates long-standing principles of stare
decisis that restrict legal precedent established by court rulings to the
facts and issues of the cases decided. '04 Third, it is inconsistent with
the California Supreme Court fairness doctrine that applies to health
insurers, 105 part of which was interpreted by Hailey to apply to
health plans. 106
98. Cal. Assemb. B. 1945. The California Health and Safety Code section 1389.3
requirement for a showing of "willful misrepresentation" was changed to "intentional
misrepresentation" in response to health plan complaints that the term willful was not well
defined in legal literature. Willful and intentional misrepresentations are considered functionally
equivalent legal standards by the DMHC for the purposes of health plan rescission. See DMHC
Amicus, supra note 3, at 22 n.31. Intentional is defined as "done with the aim of carrying out the
act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (8th ed. 2004). Willful is defined as "[v]oluntary and
intentional, but not necessarily malicious." Id. at 1630.
99. California Ass'n of Health Plans, About Us, http://www.calhealthplans.org/about
index.cfm (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
100. John Howard & Anthony York, Schwarzenegger Vetoes Rescission Bill, CAPITOL
WEEKLY, Sept. 30, 2008, at AI (emphasis added).
101. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
102. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
103. See DMHC Amicus, supra note 3, at 32.
104. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 598-99 (1860).
105. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973); Runyan v.
Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970).
106. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 802.
Fall 2009]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol.43:291
It is clear that the regulators' broad reading of Hailey 107 provides
incentives to health plans that are contrary to sound public policy and
statutory requirements. 108 Under the DMHC regulators'
interpretation, health plans now have a financial interest in doing just
enough precontract underwriting to retain their right to rescind
coverage when patients file claims for high-dollar health care
treatment. 109 Perversely, the regulators' reading of Hailey encourages
health plans to conduct minimal precontract investigations, issue
coverage, collect premiums, 110 and then retroactively cancel the
coverage of those enrollees who become seriously ill. "'
Imagine the following scenario: Months before an applicant fills
out an application for health coverage, her doctor informs her that
she has a heart murmur. The doctor explains that the heart murmur is
a common condition, which does not require medical treatment and
would not negatively affect her health. When the applicant later fills
out her application for coverage, in response to a question asking her
whether she has any "health problems," she answers "no." After all,
her physician has told her that the heart murmur does not require any
treatment. How could it then be a "health problem"? The applicant
has no intent to misrepresent her health condition. Once the
107. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
108. See DMHC Amicus, supra note 3, at 31-32.
109. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 2; see also Girion, supra note 10, at Al (reporting that
Blue Cross reviews medical records and investigates a patient's insurance risk after receiving
high-dollar-value insurance claims).
110. See Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 796 (Ct. App. 2007);
FINANCIAL REPORTING, DEP'T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORTING
FORM 3 (2008), available at http://wpso.dmhc.ca.gov/fe/search/#top. Though health plans often
return premiums to policyholders after rescinding policies, health plans retain investment income
earned off those premiums. By retaining investment income, as well as preventing payouts for
medical coverage for ill or injured policyholders, insurers profit from illegal rescissions.
111. Since the rescission surge beginning in 2001, HMOs have experienced an explosion in
profitability. Between 2001 and 2005, HMOs nationally increased their first-quarter profits by
990 percent. Consumer Watchdog, Fact Sheet-Health Plan Profitability (2008), http://www.
ConsumerWatchdog.org/resources/HealthPlanProfits.pdf. In total, just four California health
plans transferred at least $4 billion in profit to out-of-state parent companies since 2002. Id.
Health plans have also amassed reserves far in excess of state-required levels. Id. Just three
companies, including Blue Cross and the non-profits Kaiser Permanente and Blue Shield of
California, reported $16.4 billion in excess reserves. Id.; see also Lisa Girion, Health Insurer Tied
Bonuses to Dropping Sick Policyholders, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at DI. According to court
documents, California-based Health Net Inc. avoided paying $35.5 million in medical expenses
by illegally rescinding approximately 1,600 policies between 2000 and 2006. Girion, supra.
Instead of paying medical claims, Health Net paid bonuses to personnel overseeing rescissions-
the higher the dollar-value savings for the company, the higher the bonuses paid to staff carrying
out those rescissions. Id.
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application is completed, the health plan conducts an investigation to
determine the applicant's insurability but misses the physician's note
in the medical file regarding the patient's heart murmur.
After the coverage is issued, the patient is diagnosed with
cancer, and the health plan authorizes a doctor to conduct emergency
surgery. When a bill for $200,000 for the surgery and hospital stay is
submitted to the health plan for payment, the health plan then
conducts another review of the patient's records, and this time finds
the doctor's note about the patient's heart murmur. 112
The health plan argues, in accordance with the DMHC's
interpretation of Hailey, that since it completed some precontract
investigation, the review following the filing of the claim does not
constitute illegal postclaims underwriting. "' The health plan's
postclaim action is valid, according to the DMHC, as long as the
health plan completed a "reasonable" review prior to issuing the
coverage. 14
The health plan then rescinds coverage from the day it was
issued, stating that if it had known about the patient's heart murmur,
the health plan would have never issued the coverage in the first
place. "' The patient must then pay the cost of the cancer treatment
herself or, as is more likely, declare bankruptcy and possibly not
receive further treatment. 116
In addition to the clear contradictions with supreme court
precedent outlined below, the DMHC's interpretation of Hailey
contravenes overarching legislative principles of the Knox-Keene
Act, which provides for the regulation of health plans. 117 For
example, Health and Safety Code section 1342 states that its
legislative intent is to "promote the delivery and the quality of health
and medical care" by "[h]elping to ensure the best possible health
care for the public at the lowest possible cost by transferring the
financial risk of health care from patients to providers." 118
112. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 800.
113. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 2, Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d
789 (Ct. App. 2007).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Himmelstein, supra note 8.
117. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
118. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342 (West 2007).
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Prior to the Hailey decision, the DMH4C agreed that "[t]he
Legislature gave paramount importance to protecting the rights of
enrollees to the benefit of their bargain [by requiring health] plans
[to] assume financial risk, and allowed [health] plans alternative
ways to safeguard their legitimate interests." I "
However, by allowing a health plan to rescind coverage as long
as the health plan completes "reasonable" precontract underwriting,
the DMHC effectively shifts the financial risk of health care from the
health plan to the patient. Under the regulators' interpretation of
Hailey, 120 the patient bears the risk of a health plan's failure to
discover objectionable health information during the health plan's
precontract investigation. Furthermore, such an outcome is
problematic based on the very same public policy objections leveled
against postclaims underwriting, "an artificial vehicle for contract
avoidance ... quintessentially opportunistic." 121
A. Appellate Review
DMHC officials often cite the Hailey decision as the reason for
the shift in their interpretation of Health and Safety Code section
1389.3 to one not requiring a showing of "willful misrepresentation"
in cases where minimal precontract underwriting was completed. 122
However, the regulators' new position relies on an overly broad
interpretation of Hailey. That reliance conflicts with long-established
principles of judicial interpretation.
Under California law, a decision is considered binding authority
only on subsequent cases that match the specific facts and legal
issues considered by the court. 123 Despite the broad language of a
119. DMHC Amicus, supra note 3, at 26.
120. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
121. Cady & Gates, supra note 40, at 810; see also Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal
Rptr. 3d 789, 805-06 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[A] health care services plan may not adopt a 'wait and
see' attitude after learning of facts justifying rescission by continuing to collect premiums while
keeping open its rescission option if the subscriber later experiences a serious accident or illness
that generates large medical expenses.").
122. See, e.g., Evan George, State Will Reinstate Cancelled Health Policies, L.A. DAILY J.,
April 18, 2008, at Al; see also CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., COMMITTEE REPORT FOR AB 1945,
2007-2008 Sess., at 8 (2008) ("The Hailey decision... seemingly allows a health plan to rescind
on a standard less than willful misrepresentation .... ").
123. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 598-99 (1860) ("A decision is not even authority except
upon the point actually passed upon by the Court and directly involved in the case. But even then,
the mere reasoning of the Court is not authority. The point decided by the Court, and which the
reasoning illustrates and explains, constitutes a judicial precedent. The books are full of cases in
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judgment, the ratio decidendi, or the part of a holding having the
effect of precedent, is confined to the facts and issues before the
court. "24 To discern precedent from dicta,
[i]t is therefore necessary to read the language of an opinion
in the light of its facts and the issues raised, to determine (a)
which statements of law were necessary to the decision, and
therefore binding precedents, and (b) which were arguments
and general observations, unnecessary to the decision, i.e.,
dicta, with no force as precedents. 125
As discussed above, Hailey provides in part that a health plan
may rescind a contract for a material misrepresentation or omission if
the health plan can "demonstrate (1) the misrepresentation or
omission was willful, or (2) [the health plan] made reasonable efforts
to ensure the insured's application was accurate and complete"
before issuing coverage. 126
Under Hart v. Burnett 27 and the doctrine of ratio decidendi, the
precedential value of Hailey is limited to the facts and legal issues
raised by the case and the statements of law necessary to the
decision. 128 Therefore, Hailey is binding authority only in
circumstances where a health plan does not make any attempt to
confirm that the application for coverage is accurate and complete
before issuing coverage. 129 In those instances, under the ratio
decidendi of Hailey, a health plan must establish that the insured
willfully misrepresented a health fact on the application as a
condition of rescinding a coverage contract. 130 This is the extent of
the binding authority of Hailey.
The broad language in Hailey that suggests a health plan does
not have to establish a patient's willful misrepresentation in
which learned Judges have earnestly deprecated the attempt to urge the mere dicta, or the
arguments of Judges, as authoritative expositions of the law."); see also Achen v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co., 233 P.2d 74, 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) (explaining that an appellant citing
argumentative language from a prior case did not provide the court with binding authority
because such arguments were not part of the prior case's holding).
124. 9 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 509 (5th ed. 2008).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795.
127. 15 Cal. 530, 598-99 (1860).
128. See WITKIN, supra note 124.
129. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 800.
130. See id. at 804.
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circumstances where the health plan completes "reasonable"
precontract underwriting "31 is not binding authority-it is just dicta.
The Hailey decision rests on section 1389.3's bar on postclaims
underwriting, which prohibits policy rescissions "due to the plan's
failure to complete medical underwriting." '32 According to the facts
of Hailey, Blue Shield did not complete any underwriting. 133
Therefore, it was not necessary for the Hailey court to decide
whether Blue Shield, or any health plan, must establish that an
applicant willfully misrepresented 134 a health fact on an application
for coverage to determine the legality of rescission in instances
where a health plan completed "reasonable" medical underwriting.
In other words, the central legal precedent of Hailey is the
requirement that health plans complete medical underwriting prior to
issuing a contract for coverage, not which legal standard applies
when underwriting is completed. "' Thus, the DMHC regulators
incorrectly relied on the Hailey court's statement that it is
unnecessary for a health plan to meet the willful misrepresentation
requirement in instances where precontract underwriting was
'reasonable.' That statement is unnecessary to the decision (i.e.,
dictum), and does not have the effect of precedent. 136
B. Role of Knowledge and Understanding
in Supreme Court Precedent
Not only is the DMHC regulators' interpretation of Hailey
inconsistent with principles of judicial interpretation, it also conflicts
with the public policy goals of the fairness doctrine articulated in
California Supreme Court precedents. In particular, the California
Supreme Court has provided protections against coverage rescission
for innocent health insurance patients .. relying on California
131. Id. at 795.
132. Id. at 798; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3 (West 2007) ("No health
care service plan shall engage in the practice of postclaims underwriting.").
133. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 796 ("Based on the information provided in the application,
Blue Shield extended coverage to Cindy and her family at its 'premier' or best rate ... .
134. Id.
135. See id. at 804.
136. See WrTrN, supra note 124; see also Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 598-99 (1860)
(explaining that "general expressions" within a particular case help illustrate questions before the
court but do not control judgments beyond the case because such expressions do not receive the
same amount of investigation as the primary issues).
137. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973).
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Insurance Code statutes applying to health insurers, not Health and
Safety Code statues applying to health plans. The general principle is
that if an applicant for coverage was unaware of a health condition,
or did not understand the nature of the condition, the failure to
disclose that health information on an application for coverage is
insufficient grounds for rescinding a coverage contract. 138 This
protection persists regardless of whether a health insurer completes
"reasonable" precontract underwriting. 139 Simply, supreme court
precedent is at odds with the DMHC regulators' overbroad reading
of Hailey, 140 holding that a health insurer may not rescind an
insurance contract based on an alleged misrepresentation if the
applicant did not have the requisite state of mind. 41
In Thompson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co., the California
Supreme Court found that a failure to disclose medical information
could not provide the basis for rescission if the applicant "had no
present knowledge of the facts sought, or failed to appreciate the
significance of information related to him." 142 Further, a health
insurer bears the burden of proving that a misrepresentation
occurred. "' The misrepresentation is established by negating to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact various plausible explanations by the
applicant for the incomplete answers on an application. "4
In Thompson, the plaintiff challenged a life insurance
company's refusal to honor a policy on the basis of fraud. The
insurer, Occidental, alleged that the deceased, Donald Thompson,
had misrepresented approximately ten medical consultations he had
with five different doctors. 45 Occidental alleged that Thompson also
failed to disclose several minor health conditions and one major
problem, arteriosclerosis, or hardening of the arteries. 146 The latter,
Occidental claimed, had substantially reduced Thompson's life
138. See id.
139. Thompson considers a life insurance contract governed by the Insurance Code, which
applies to health insurance companies but does not apply to health care service plans governed by
the Health and Safety Code.
140. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
141. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
142. Id.; Ransom v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 274 P.2d 633, 636 (Cal. 1954).
143. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 362.
144. Id. at 363.
145. Id. at 360.
146. Id. at 361.
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expectancy, 147 and Thompson's failure to disclose the condition
constituted a fraudulent misrepresentation of his health condition. '
Under Thompson, however, the insured's state of mind at the
time of applying for coverage is essential to determining whether the
applicant had the capacity to "misrepresent" the information in
question. 141 In fact, the term "misrepresentation" denotes a positive
act of deception or concealment. "Misrepresentation" is commonly
defined as "making a false or misleading assertion about something,
usually with the intent to deceive." '50 Conversely, an "innocent
misrepresentation" is a "false statement that the speaker or writer
does not know is false." 5' The supreme court blocked Occidental's
attempt to hold the insurance policy void on the basis of fraud,
finding that Thompson lacked the state of mind to misrepresent his
health condition. 152 A successful action to "void" a contract is similar
in outcome to an action to rescind because a voided contract is
considered to have "no legal effect," ' whereas a rescinded contract
is a considered retroactively revoked. 154
The Thompson court noted that in regards to the arteriosclerosis,
none of Thompson's doctors had informed him that he had the
disease. ' Further, the court concluded that Thompson plausibly did
not disclose the leg pain associated with the arteriosclerosis because
he believed it to be related to a varicose vein condition that he had
disclosed. 56 Regarding the various undisclosed physician
consultations, the Thompson court found that the medical terms used
by physicians during those visits "might well have been meaningless
jargon to him." 157 Thus, the trial court might have conceivably
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 360.
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1022 (8th ed. 2004).
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. See Thompson, 513 P.2d at 361.
153. BLACK'S, supra note 150, at 1604.
154. Id. at 1332.
155. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 361.
156. Id. Thompson's doctor had told him that the leg pain he was experiencing had
"something to do with circulation." According to Dr. Pellegrin, "You don't want to get somebody
all wound up and alarmed and concerned [by telling them they have a serious illness]." Id.
157. Id. at 362.
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believed that Thompson, a layman, "failed to recollect or appreciate
the significance of the various consultations." "'
In the words of the Hailey court, Thompson's failure to
comprehend the significance of his health condition negated his
ability to misrepresent it. 159 Further, Occidental failed in its duty to
rule out "plausible explanations for the incomplete answers on
Thompson's application." 6' Such explanations may reasonably
explain why Thompson failed to disclose the medical information. 61
Therefore, Occidental could not hold the contract void on the basis of
misrepresentation. 162
The Thompson court's refusal to allow an insurer to void a
contract for coverage in circumstances where the patient did not
know of, or did not understand the importance of, the medical
information that the insurer claims was misrepresented 163 contradicts
the DMHC regulators' overbroad reading of Hailey. The latter's
straitjacket approach, in instances where the health plan completed
"reasonable" precontract underwriting, is unconcerned with the
applicant's awareness of, or understanding of, the health information
omitted or misrepresented on the application for coverage. "
Other supreme court precedents applying to health insurers also
contradict the DMHC regulators' position on the current law
governing health plan rescissions in instances where the applicant
layman did not understand the medical information related to him by
his doctor. In Cohen v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 165 the court
found that a layman's failure to understand the meaning of certain
medical terms might provide a reasonable explanation for an
158. Id.
159. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360
("Questions concerning illness or disease do not relate to minor indispositions but are to be
construed as referring to serious ailments .. "); Cohen v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 312 P.2d 241,
244 (Cal. 1957) ("[A] layman might reasonably be excused if, in disclosing information, he failed
to understand the meaning of certain medical terms and for that reason omitted some fact in his
medical history.").
160. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 363.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 360.
164. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
165. 312 P.2d 241 (Cal. 1957).
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applicant's failure to disclose a medical condition. 166 In Cohen, the
insured was in fact deemed to have known that he suffered from high
blood pressure. 167 The insured, Cohen, a physician himself,
acknowledged certain ailments under oath as a condition of receiving
an army commission prior to applying for insurance coverage. 168 For
that reason, the court found adequate grounds for the trial court's
finding that Cohen had the state of mind necessary to misrepresent
his health information on the application for coverage. 169
On the other hand, in Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance
Co., which preceded Cohen, the supreme court found that the insured
did not misrepresent that he had high blood pressure, and that an
action to void the policy on the basis of fraud was invalid. 170 In
Ransom, a doctor had informed the insured that he had "mild
hypertension," but the court concluded that it was unclear whether
the insured knew what the term meant, and that the insured thus
conceivably lacked the state of mind to misrepresent the condition on
his application for coverage."' The holdings of Cohen and Ransom
conflict with the DMHC regulators' reading of Hailey because under
the latter's approach, the layman's lack of knowledge is not an
essential factor in determining whether a rescission is an appropriate
remedy in the health plan context. 172
The hypothetical discussed above "' provides a possible scenario
under the DMHC's interpretation of the law following Hailey, '4 but
is inconsistent with the principles announced by the California
Supreme Court in Thompson 175 and Cohen. 176 In the hypothetical,
doctors told the patient that the heart murmur condition did not
require treatment. Such advice from a physician could certainly
166. Id. at 244; see also Ransom v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins., Co., 274 P.2d. 633, 637 (Cal. 1954)
(finding that a patient who did not understand the meaning of "hypertension" might have
reasonably failed to understand that the term related to blood pressure).
167. Cohen v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 312 P.2d 241, 243 (Cal. 1957).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 244.
170. Ransom, 274 P.2d at 636.
171. Id. at 637.
172. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
173. See discussion supra Part II1.
174. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
175. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973).
176. Cohen v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 312 P.2d 241, 244 (Cal. 1957).
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provide a jury with a plausible explanation under the Thompson
doctrine 177 for the applicant's failure to disclose this condition when
asked about "health problems" on the application for coverage.
Such a statement about the nature of the condition from a
physician negates an applicant's capacity for misrepresentation. "' A
health plan's failure to rule out the possibility that the reason for the
nondisclosure was the applicant's misunderstanding that the heart
murmur was a health condition requiring disclosure would also bar a
lower court from finding that the condition was misrepresented under
the Thompson doctrine. 179
A similar outcome is reached under the principles applied by the
Ransom court in deciding that a layman's failure to understand
complex medical terms negated his capacity for misrepresentation.
An explanation by a physician that suggests the patient's condition is
not "medical" in nature because it warrants no treatment, as in our
hypothetical, provides a reasonable basis for the applicant's failure to
report it in response to an application question inquiring about
"medical conditions." 180 Under the Thompson analysis, s' when the
applicant has been told about a condition, but due to the nature of the
disclosure, the patient does not "appreciate the significance of the
subject matter" related to him, 182 "incorrect or incomplete responses
[on an application for coverage do] not constitute grounds for
rescission." "'
The application of the Thompson doctrine 184 to the Hailey
scenario would provide a similar result. 185 Where the Hailey court
found that Cindy Hailey's misunderstanding of the application
question negates an inference of willful misrepresentation, 186 a court
deciding the same issue under the Thompson doctrine would likely
find that an applicant's failure to understand whose health
177. Thompson, 513 P.2dat 360.
178. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360; Cohen,
312 P.2d at 244.
179. See Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
180. Cohen, 312 P.2d at 244.
181. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
182. Id. at 362.
183. Id. at 360.
184. Id. at 360.
185. Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 800 (Ct. App. 2007).
186. Id. at 799.
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information is sought on an application means that the applicant has
"no present knowledge of the facts sought." 187 The key distinction,
however, is that the Thompson rule applies regardless of the level of
precontract medical underwriting that is completed.
C. Status Quo Ante: Limits on the Rescission Remedy
The DMHC regulators' overbroad reading of Hailey 1" is also in
conflict with statutory and common law restrictions on the
application of the rescission remedy. 189 Namely, the regulators'
interpretation is directly at odds with the requirement that both
parties be returned to the status quo ante following a rescission. 190
In the context of health plan rescissions, it is often impossible to
return a patient whose policy was rescinded to the status quo ante-a
position in which the patient could purchase new individual health
coverage from another health plan. ' Since a health coverage
rescission often occurs following a major illness, rescinded patients
will find it difficult, and likely impossible, to obtain new coverage
since health plans commonly refused to accept applicants with even
minor health problems. 192 As discussed below, in instances where an
innocent patient cannot be returned to the status quo ante, rescission
may not be a valid remedy. 19 Though the status quo ante limitation
on rescission is acknowledged by the Hailey court, the DMHC
regulators have not incorporated this requirement in their current
view of the law as it relates to health coverage rescission. 194
Case law has long recognized a return to the status quo ante as
an essential element of the rescission remedy. Citing both California
Civil Code section 1692 "' and a long line of California cases, 196 the
187. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
188. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
189. Runyan v. Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970).
190. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1692 (West 2007) ( "In an action . . . based upon
rescission, the court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to make any
compensation to the other which justice may require and may otherwise in its judgment adjust the
equities between the parties.").
191. See discussion infra Part III.C.
192. See discussion infra Part III.C.
193. See Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 802 (Ct. App. 2007).
194. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 802.
195. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1692.
196. Bank of Am. v. Greenbach, 219 P.2d 814, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); see also Utemark v.
Samuel, 257 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (stating that the purpose of rescission is to place
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California Supreme Court in Runyan found that "in [rescission]
actions the court should do complete equity between the parties." 1
97
The court went on to find, in language that reverberates through case
law, 198 that "[iut is the purpose of rescission 'to restore both parties to
their former position as far as possible' and 'to bring about
substantial justice by adjusting the equities between the parties'
despite the fact that 'the status quo cannot be exactly
reproduced."' '" "[T]here is no requirement that the party against
whom rescission is invoked be restored to the status quo ante.""'
Traditionally, whether the rescinded party must be returned to the
status quo ante depends upon a weighing of the equities. 20'
Under this approach, the state of mind of the party to be
rescinded-for example, whether she intended to misrepresent a
health condition when applying for coverage-is a key determinate
of whether a party deserves to be returned to the status quo ante. As
articulated in Spencer v. Deems, 2 2 the general rule is that a court of
equity will not "decree a rescission of an executed contract unless the
party desirous of effecting such rescission is able to place the
defendant in statu quo."2 3 However, the rule is "not without
exception.""2o
That exception is provided in cases where the party whose
contract was rescinded intended to deceive the rescinding party and
the rescission "is sought upon the ground of fraud." 2 5 Under those
circumstances, "it would be manifestly unjust and inequitable or
the defendants in the status quo regardless of any loss plaintiffs might suffer, even if plaintiffs
were entitled to be restored to their former position); Lobdell v. Miller, 250 P.2d 357, 367 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1952) ("[T]he fact that the status quo cannot be exactly reproduced will not preclude the
plaintiffs from equitable relief.").
197. Runyan v. Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970) (citing Stewart v.
Crowley, 3 P.2d 562, 565 (Cal. 1931)),
198. See, e.g., Bank ofAm., 219 P.2d at 827.
199. Runyan, 466 P.2d at 691 (citing Bank ofAm., 219 P.2d at 827).
200. In re Thomas Lloyd, 369 B.R. 549, 561 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007), aff'd, 2008 WL 298820
(N.D. Cal.).
201. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1692 (West 2007) ("If in an action or proceeding a party seeks
relief based upon rescission, the court may require the party to whom such relief is granted to
make any compensation to the other which justice may require and may otherwise in its judgment
adjust the equities between the parties." (emphasis added)).
202. 185 P. 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).
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impossible to apply such a rule, ' 20 6 and the court may "decree
rescission, notwithstanding . . . [the fact that the fraudulent] party
may not be placed exactly in statu quo. 2 7 Similarly, Snelson v.
Ondulando Highlands Corp. 208 suggests that fraud will weigh against
a party in a balancing of equities and allow a rescission even if the
party committing fraud cannot be returned to the status quo ante. 209
The implication of Runyan, Snelson, and Spencer taken to
together seems to be that innocent parties whose coverage was
rescinded-those who did not act fraudulently-should be returned
to the status quo ante by the rescinding party. The DMHC regulators'
blanket statement that health plan contracts may be rescinded
regardless of the patient's intent or mental state, as long as
precontract underwriting was "reasonable," fails to account for the
analysis required by Runyan, 210 Spencer, 21' and Snelson. 212
Assuming that a court finds that a rescinded party is deserving
of a return to the status quo ante-that is, the rescinded party is
innocent of misrepresentation or fraud-the next question is how the
status quo ante is achieved. California courts2"3 have found that
money damages, in addition to restitution of the consideration
provided under the contract, are sometimes necessary to put a
rescinded party back in the status quo ante. 214
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 84 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1970).
209. Id. at 809; see also Green v. Duvergey, 80 P. 234, 238 (Cal. 1905) ("It is not an
invariable rule that the rescission of a contract obtained by fraud will be denied merely upon the
ground that the parties cannot be placed in statu quo. If equity can still be done between the
parties, courts will grant relief to the defrauded party.").
210. Runyan v. Pacifica Air Indus. Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970).
211. 185 P. at 672.
212. 84 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
213. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Greenbach, 219 P.2d 814, 827-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)
("Authorities are legion and uniform to the effect that the legal effect of a rescission is to restore
both parties to their former position as far as possible. The authorities also agree that, concurrent
with the award of rescission, the trial court may award money damages or order such other relief
as justice may require. That means the return to each party, so far as possible, of the property that
he parted with at the time of the settlement." (citations omitted)).
214. Runyan, 466 P.2d at 690 ("Some of these cases refer to such monetary awards given in
an action for rescission as 'damages' or 'consequential damages."'); see also I IA Cal. Jur. 3d
Cancellation of Instruments § 54 (2008) ("[Blecause actions for cancellation are equitable, there
may be recovered, beyond the consideration parted with, compensation for whatever
consequential damages the party may have suffered by reason of having entered into the
transaction.").
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However, the Hailey court discusses the "unique challenges"
that courts must confront when attempting to return an innocent
patient to the status quo ante in the health coverage rescission
context. 215 In fact, a return to the status quo ante may be impossible.
Since a health plan coverage rescission often occurs following a
major illness, rescinded patients will find it difficult, and likely
impossible, to ever obtain new coverage. 216 For these patients, the
status quo ante cannot be achieved. For example, patients who, like
the Haileys, had the option of obtaining coverage from an employer
prior to the rescission, likely no longer have that option following the
rescission.
Rescinded patients who have suffered major debilitating
illnesses requiring lengthy treatment and recovery, or who have
permanent disabilities, like Steve Hailey, 217 may not be able to return
to work immediately, if at all. If the rescinded patient does have the
option of obtaining new employment-based health coverage
following a rescission, or can take advantage of coverage obtained
by a working spouse,218 the status quo ante might be achieved, but
only if the rescinding health plan is required to cover the patient until
the employer's health coverage enrollment period begins. 219
Other challenges of returning the rescinded patient to the status
quo ante arise due to the right of the new employer's health plan to
exclude from coverage certain preexisting medical conditions for up
to six months. 220 Any treatment related to preexisting medical
conditions would not be paid by the new health plan during that time
period. 221 Under this scenario, the status quo ante might be achieved,
but only if the rescinding health plan were required to pay for
treatment related to these preexisting conditions until coverage under
the new health plan is available.
215. Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 802 (Ct. App. 2007).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 796-97.
218. See generally Robyn Shelton, Sick & Fired: Is There 'Health Discrimination' in the
Workplace? ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 19, 2008, at Al (reporting that businesses may fire sick
employees to avoid increased health care costs).
219. State of California, Group Coverage Through Your Job, http://www.opa.ca.gov/
healthcare/health-plan/group-coverage.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
220. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.50(b)(8)(c) (West 2007).
221. State of California, Pre-Existing Conditions, http://www.opa.ca.gov/healthcare/health-
plan/pre-existing-conditions.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
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In all instances, achieving the status quo ante requires quick
intervention by courts or regulators to prevent the degradation of the
rescinded patient's health. Permanent injury may result due to gaps
in health coverage and the patient's resulting inability to access
needed treatments. 222 Even under the best-case scenario in which
new coverage is available immediately from an employer, many
rescinded patients may face other damages. For example, the
rescinded patient's inability to obtain individual coverage may cause
her to forgo early retirement or entrepreneurial ventures.
The self-employed, those working for employers that do not
provide coverage, and those whose permanent injuries bar them from
seeking employment will likely never be able to purchase health
coverage on their own following a rescission. Individual policies, as
opposed to group policies provided by employers, are purchased
directly by the consumer, or through an insurance agent, from the
health plan for individual or family coverage. 223 Under state law in
thirty-eight states, including California, health plans may medically
underwrite such individual policies and refuse to sell coverage, even
if an applicant has only relatively minor health problems. 224 Asthma,
acne, allergies, and arthritis are all deemed "uninsurable" conditions
by major California health plans. 225 In fact, health plans have
unilateral control over the content and conditions of their
underwriting guidelines.
26
Since the recent spate of individual policy rescissions in
California have often occurred following major illnesses,227 placing
these patients in the status quo ante-a position in which the patient
could purchase new individual health coverage from another health
plan-is likely impossible. Serious preexisting conditions will almost
certainly run afoul of another health plan's underwriting guidelines,
222. Hailey, 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 798.
223. State of California, Individual Coverage, http://www.opa.ca.gov/healthcare/health-plan/
individual-coverage.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
224. NCSL REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-3.
225. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.4; Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, supra
note 3 1.
226. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.4.
227. Girion, supra note 10, at Al (reporting that Blue Cross designated an entire department
inside the company that, upon receiving high-dollar-value insurance claims, reviews medical
records and investigates a patient's insurance risk).
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and therefore prohibit rescinded patients from attaining new
coverage in the individual-policy market. 228
Additionally, a unilateral rescission based on the mere
allegation of fraud by the health plan bars the rescinded patient from
enrolling in state-funded programs designed to provide coverage to
the medically uninsurable.229 Simply returning the premiums paid by
the insured does not return these patients to the status quo ante. 230
Money damages are also inadequate to compensate the innocent
patient whose health coverage has been rescinded. Courts would be
hard pressed to calculate the value of lost future health coverage and
resulting out-of-pocket costs for potentially decades' worth of
uncovered medical expenses. 231 Further, the patient plaintiff would
likely not be able to prove, with the level of certainty needed to
receive expectancy damages, the value of forgoing early retirement
or the lost future profits of an entrepreneurial business venture that
could not be pursued. 232 What is the pecuniary equivalent of mental
anguish and worry of facing future illness without insurance
coverage?
Given these unique challenges of returning rescinded patients to
the status quo ante, the Hailey court, relying on the Runyan court's
analysis, 233 appears to acknowledge that where both parties cannot be
returned to the status quo ante, or something resembling the status
quo ante, rescission may not be an appropriate remedy. 234 The Hailey
court is careful to note that its findings regarding the equitable nature
of health plan rescission are not meant to signal a change in the law
of rescission but "to illustrate the backdrop of section 1389.3."235
228. State of California, Individual Coverage, http://www.opa.ca.gov/healthcare/health-plan/
individual-coverage.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
229. MRMIP ENROLLMENT UNIT, CALIFORNIA MAJOR RISK MEDICAL INSURANCE
PROGRAM, 2009 APPLICATION AND HANDBOOK 2 (2009).
230. Cady & Gates, supra note 40, at 818-19 (2000) ("The insured.., despite the premium
refund, has lost both the opportunity to procure other insurance and the security and peace of
mind for which he originally bargained."); see also Runyan v. Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d
682, 691 (Cal. 1970) ("California courts applying general principles of equity have recognized
that the restoration to the rescinding party of the consideration with which he originally parted
does not necessarily in all instances restore him to his former position and bring about substantial
justice.").
231. See JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 6.5 (3d ed. 1997).
232. Id.
233. Runyan, 466 P.2d at 691.
234. Hailey v. Cal. Physicians' Serv., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 802 (Ct. App. 2007).
235. Id. at 802 n.6 (emphasis added).
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The suggestion is that notwithstanding Health and Safety Code
section 1389.3, an innocent patient's policy cannot be rescinded if
the requirements of Runyan cannot be met. The DMHC regulators
overlook these limitations of the rescission remedy articulated in the
Hailey decision. 236
The state of mind of the patient at the time the application was
completed should be a central and essential factor in determining
whether rescission is an appropriate remedy in the health plan
context. Runyan, 2 37 together with the analysis required by Spencer, 
2 38
Snelson,2 39 and Hailey,24 ° suggests that a patient innocent of
committing fraud may challenge a rescission on the grounds that the
status quo ante could not be achieved. Such principles are in conflict
with the broad pronouncements by regulators that rescissions may be
carried out regardless of whether an omission on an application was
intentional as long as the health plan completed "reasonable"
precontract medical underwriting. 241
IV. PROPOSAL
California statute and supreme court precedent protect innocent
patients from facing health coverage rescissions. 242 However, the
DMHC regulators' current view of the law of health plan rescissions
would allow a health plan to rescind innocent patients' coverage as
long as the health plan conducted a "reasonable" review prior to
issuing the policies. 243
Either proposed but currently shelved regulations clarifying the
legal standard for health plan rescissions should be implemented, 2"
236. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
237. 466 P.2d at 691.
238. 185 P. 671, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).
239. 84 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809 (Ct. App. 1970).
240. 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 802 (Ct. App. 2007).
241. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
242. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973); Runyan, 466 P.2d
at 691; Spencer, 185 P. at 672.
243. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
244. Draft Postclaims Underwriting Regulations, CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 28 §§ 1300.89.1,
1300.89.3 (2006), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/
DraftPCUWRegs.pdf ("No subscriber contract shall be cancelled or rescinded because of a
misstatement or omission in the coverage contract, unless the misstatement or omission is a result
of the applicant's willful misrepresentation and the omitted information would have been a basis
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or new legislation or court action must be implemented to bring
health plan rescissions in line with the fairness doctrine established
by Thompson245 and Runyan. 24 Simply, Thompson protects an
innocent health insurance applicant-one who did not have the
requisite state of mind to misrepresent her health information-from
rescission.247 Equally, Runyan, 248  along with Snelson 4 9 and
Spencer, 2" established that the state of mind of the rescinded party-
namely whether the patient intended to commit fraud-is the central
factor for determining whether the remedy of rescission may be
applied. 25
A. New Legislation
An alternative to reviving section 1389.3 regulations is new
legislation clarifying the statutory and common law requirements and
limitations of the rescission remedy. As discussed earlier, AB
1945 252 and its predecessor, Assembly Bill 2 (AB 2), provide one
such model. Texas law provides another.
AB 2 provided that prior to rescinding coverage, the health plan
must "demonstrate[] that the applicant intentionally misrepresented
or intentionally omitted material information on the application.
with the purpose of misrepresenting his or her health history in order
to obtain health care coverage." 
2 53
The AB 2 requirement that a health plan demonstrate that a
patient "intentionally misrepresented or intentionally omitted"
material health information would supplement section 1389.3's
current requirement for a "showing of willful misrepresentation."254
This clarification was suggested by health plans, arguing that "willful
for denial of coverage pursuant to the plan's underwriting criteria, guidelines, policies, and
procedures.").
245. 513 P.2d at 360.
246. 466 P.2d at 691.
247. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
248. 466 P.2d at 691.
249. 84 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809 (Ct. App. 1970).
250. 185 P. 671, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).
251. See discussion supra Part III.C.
252. See discussion supra Part II.C.
253. On October 11, 2009 Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed AB 2. Assem. B. 2, 2009 Leg.,
2009-2010 Reg. Sess., pg. 6-7 at section 1389.11(3) (Cal. 2009), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/abOOO1-0050/ab_2 bill_20090916_enrolled.pdf
254. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1389.3 (West 2007).
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misrepresentation" was inadequately defined in the existing law.
Willful and intentional misrepresentations are seen as functional
equivalents by health plan rescission experts. 255
The AB 2 phrase "with the purpose of misrepresenting his or her
health history in order to obtain health care coverage" builds on
Thompson's bar on rescission in cases where an insured "had no
present knowledge of the facts sought, or failed to appreciate the
significance of information related to him."256 Simply, if an applicant
failed to "appreciate the significance of information" related to her
by her physician, then the patient lacked the state of mind necessary
to misrepresent her health history in order to obtain health care
coverage.257
Alternatively, Texas courts require an insurer seeking to rescind
a life insurance policy to show that the insured had the "intent to
deceive" the insurer. 258 Both the Texas Supreme Court and the Fifth
Circuit have held that an insurer seeking to rescind a life insurance
policy must plead and prove five elements:
1. The making of a representation.
2. The falsity of the representation.
3. Reliance on the representation by the insurer.
4. The intent to deceive on the part of the insured.
5. The materiality of the representation. 259
B. Future Court Decisions
If new legislation or regulations are not enacted, future courts
should correct the DMHC regulators' dangerous interpretation of
Hailey. 260 Namely, in a lawsuit in which the health plan claimed that
it did complete "reasonable" medical underwriting prior to issuing
255. See DMHC Amicus, supra note 3, at 22 n.31. "Intentional" is defined as "done with the
aim of carrying out the act." BLACK'S, supra note 150, at 826 (8th ed. 2004). "Willful" is defined
as "[v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious." Id. at 1630.
256. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973); Ransom v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 274 P.2d 633, 636-37 (Cal. 1954).
257. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
258. Andrew C. Whitaker, Rescission of Life Insurance Policies in Texas, 59 BAYLOR L.
REv. 139 (2007).
259. Id. at 139 n.1 (emphasis added). Alternatively, a 2008 New Mexico law bars health
insurance rescissions except in instances of "willful or fraudulent misstatements." S.B. 226, 48th
Leg., 2d Sess. at I(N.M. 2008), available at http://www.sos.state.nm.us/2008/SBilI226.pdf.
260. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
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coverage, a future court should build upon Hailey by establishing
that willful misrepresentation is a prerequisite to any rescission under
Health and Safety Code section 1389.3. Such a finding would bring
health plan rescissions in line with the fairness doctrine established
by Thompson26' and Runyan,262 the legislature's intent in enacting
the Knox-Keene Act generally26 3 and section 1389.3 specifically, 264
and the public policy pronouncements by the DMHC and by
Governor Schwarzenegger. 265
V. CONCLUSION
The DMHC regulators' overbroad interpretation of Hailey
means that purchasing health coverage in good faith will not
guarantee that a health plan will fulfill its promise to pay for health
care. Under the regulators' interpretation, health plans may rescind
an innocent patient's health coverage when she is sick and needs
health care the most. The rescission may be carried out regardless of
whether the applicant knew of or understood the health information
that was allegedly omitted or misrepresented. 266 Under the
regulators' view, the state of mind of the applicant is not an essential
factor in determining whether a rescission is rightful as long as the
health plan's precontract underwriting was "reasonable." '267 Thus,
patients enrolled in HMO or PPO plans regulated by the DMHC
could have their coverage rescinded even if they were innocent of
misrepresentation, while those patients enrolled in coverage provided
by the California Department of Insurance, apparently identical in
many ways to DMHC coverage, would be protected by supreme
court precedent.
Even if subsequent regulation or legislation more clearly defines
what constitutes "reasonable underwriting," such a rule will not
guarantee that health plan patients innocent of willful or intentional
misrepresentation would be spared rescission. "' Such rescissions
261. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
262. Runyan v. Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970).
263. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342 (West 2007).
264. See Torres, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 3 and 17.
266. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
267. Id.
268. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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supported by "reasonable" underwriting conflict with California
Supreme Court doctrine protecting innocent insurance patients from
actions to void a contract. 269
In addition to contradicting Thompson, which bars the use of
innocent mistakes to void a policy, 270 the DMHC regulators' overly
broad reading of Hailey271 violates common law principles. In
Runyan, the California Supreme Court canonized common law
restrictions on rescission in instances where the rescinded party
cannot be returned to the status quo ante. 272 Other, older California
cases applying this doctrine demonstrate that parties innocent of
fraud must be returned to the status quo ante, or something
resembling the status quo ante-for example, a position where they
may obtain health coverage from another health plan-which is often
impossible in the context of health coverage rescissions, as noted by
the Hailey court. 273 Where patients innocent of fraud cannot be
returned to the status quo ante, rescission may not be an appropriate
remedy. 274
Twenty-two million California patients enrolled in DMHC-
regulated health plans potentially face coverage rescissions though
they intended no misrepresentation when completing enrollment
applications. 275 The DMHC regulators' view of the current law
governing health plan rescission conflicts with supreme court
doctrine and common law precedent applicable to health insurers that
must be rationalized to provide parity under the law. Simply,
rescission should be barred if a patient did not intentionally or
willfully misrepresent276 a health condition when applying for
coverage. 277
269. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973); Runyan v.
Pacifica Air Indus., Inc., 466 P.2d 682, 691 (Cal. 1970).
270. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360. Failing to disclose health information does not provide a
basis for voiding a policy if the applicant "had no present knowledge of the facts sought, or failed
to appreciate the significance of information." Id.
271. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3.
272. Runyan, 466 P.2d at 691.
273. See discussion supra Part III.C.
274. Id.
275. See supra note 1.
276. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 513 P.2d 353, 360 (Cal. 1973).
277. Runyan, 466 P.2d at 691; see also Snelson v. Ondulando Highlands Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr.
800, 809 (Ct. App. 1970) ("In an action predicated on fraud, the fact that the parties cannot be
restored to the exact Status quo ante will not prevent a court of equity from granting
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This change would bring health plan rescissions into line with
the supreme court fairness doctrine established by Thompson 278 and
Runyan, 279 the legislature's intent in enacting the Knox-Keene Act
generally28 and section 1389.3 specifically, 281 and the public policy
pronouncements by the DMHC and by Governor Schwarzenegger. 82
rescission . ); Spencer v. Deems, 185 P. 671, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919) (finding rescission
appropriate when the defendant knowingly made a material misstatement, even if the defendant
could not be fully placed in the status quo).
278. Thompson, 513 P.2d at 360.
279. Runyan, 466 P.2d at 691.
280. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342 (West 2007).
281. See Torres, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
282. Seesupra notes 3, 17.
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